Docs / Keep your own proof

Keep your own proof

PubPhys fixes each signed contribution in Bitcoin. You can hold the proof yourself.

Which contributions carry a proof

A proposed correction is a comment: it is not signed and carries no proof (comments). Topics, contests, appeals and editors' decisions are signed too; the panel and the button are not offered for them yet.

Saving it

  1. Sign. The page you reach after signing shows "Recorded": the time, the fingerprints and the Bitcoin state. Your result's page, your problem's page and a signed change's page show the same panel to you alone; a sealed contribution shows its state on its row in Your drafts.
  2. Wait for Bitcoin. The state reads "Queued for a Bitcoin timestamp" until it is sent, within minutes, then "Waiting for Bitcoin", usually for a few hours, then "In Bitcoin block N" with the block's date. If every attempt fails, it reads "No Bitcoin timestamp": that is final, and no new attempt is made. Once the block is in, your Notifications page says so, once: "Your solution to ... is in Bitcoin block N. Save the proof." The optional email digest counts it as a notice about your own item; no mail of its own is sent.
  3. Press "Save proof". You get one zip file.
  4. Keep it in two places you control. Your disk and one backup. For a sealed contribution, keep it private.
  5. Check it whenever you like. Open README.txt in the zip: it says what this copy holds and gives the commands below.

A copy saved before the Bitcoin block has no date in it: its timestamp files are calendar servers' promises, not a block. Save the proof again once the page shows the block. A copy saved after it says, in README.txt, which timestamp file is in the block; a file of an earlier attempt can still read "pending" there.

What the proof shows

Once a block confirms it: these exact files and this text, signed in to by your ORCID account, existed before that Bitcoin block. A change of one bit in a file changes its fingerprint, and the proof no longer checks. Before the block, the proof shows the signature, the PubPhys seal and the log entry, and no date.

The Bitcoin date and the fingerprints check without trusting PubPhys. The signature check trusts the PubPhys keys and ORCID's key, which the commands below take from the public log and from ORCID, not from this site.

It does not show:

The block's time must lie between 2 hours before and 72 hours after your ORCID sign-in (the protocol accepts the sign-in only then). If it does not, the panel says so: the date and the fingerprints still check, the full check reports the identity part failed, and README.txt does not claim the sign-in.

What is in the zip

A withheld text or file is left out, and README.txt names it with its fingerprint.

Your name. The proof contains your ORCID sign-in token, which carries your name as ORCID has it.

Inspection commands

They show what is in the files; they are not a check. The first needs only your computer, the second any OpenTimestamps client, on a timestamp file that README.txt lists as in a block.

shasum -a 256 files/1-original.pdf        # prints the fingerprint (SHA-256) listed in README.txt
ots info timestamps/attested-1.json.ots   # shows the path to the Bitcoin block, or "pending" before it

The full check

It checks the text, who signed, the PubPhys seal, the public log and the Bitcoin date. It needs your saved proof and four things that are not in the zip: the checking program, a copy of the public log, ORCID's public key and Bitcoin block headers. The program and the log are on GitHub; none of the four comes from pubphys.com. The commands need Node.js 20 or later and git. The check of a proof in your browser on the Verify page reads a single record file, not the zip.

curl -LO https://github.com/Galitski-group/pubphys-verifier/releases/download/v0.2.0/pubphys-verifier-v0.2.0.tar.gz
shasum -a 256 pubphys-verifier-v0.2.0.tar.gz
    # expected 09841fe7dc19e972828d2a8778bef7bd52ca1958021dd0c9315f42c4c5ffbe7d
tar xzf pubphys-verifier-v0.2.0.tar.gz && V=$PWD/pubphys-verifier-v0.2.0/verifier
git clone https://github.com/Galitski-group/pubphys-log
node $V/fetch-trust.mjs --dir pubphys-log --bitcoin > my-trust.json
node $V/fetch-witness.mjs --bundle proof.json --trust my-trust.json --dir pubphys-log --fetch-sigstore-root-unverified > trust-witness.json
node $V/fetch-orcid-keys.mjs --trust trust-witness.json --dir pubphys-log --live > trust-full.json
node $V/pubphys-verify.mjs proof.json --trust trust-full.json --bitcoin --require structure,content,identity,platform,log,time

A complete proof ends with result: all required parts verified. The time part is required: without it the program would accept a copy that holds no date. A copy saved before the block cannot pass this; check what it holds with the last command without --bitcoin and with --require structure,content,identity,platform,log. README.txt gives the exact command for its copy.

A file's .proof.json has no timestamp of its own: the file is dated through proof.json, which names its fingerprint. So its check leaves time out (--require structure,content,identity,platform,log, without --bitcoin). A file uploaded before an earlier log state was witnessed has that earlier state in its .proof.json, and the witness step is run for it on its own. README.txt gives these commands too.

The witness step (fetch-witness.mjs) finds the log state of your copy in the copy of the public log. Each log state is taken up there, and in the outside log Rekor, within about an hour. A copy saved in that first hour, as one saved right after signing usually is, has a log state that is not there yet: its README.txt leaves the step out and passes my-trust.json to fetch-orcid-keys.mjs, the log part is checked against the PubPhys key alone, and the result reads witness not_checked. Save the proof again later, as you will for the Bitcoin block anyway, to get a copy with the step.

--live adds the key ORCID serves today, and the check accepts that key for one day after it was fetched: for a later check, run fetch-orcid-keys.mjs again. Once ORCID has replaced its key, leave --live out: the program then uses the Internet Archive's copies of ORCID's keys, which a later check can still use. --fetch-sigstore-root-unverified skips one check of the outside log's key list. The strict form, and what each part of the result means, is on How PubPhys proves what and when.

Confirmed is not the same as archived

"Bitcoin confirmed" means the date is fixed. A check years from now also needs what is not in the zip. Keep beside it the program's release file, your copy of the public log and the trust-full.json you made: the ORCID keys in it from the Internet Archive's copies keep counting, while the one --live added counts for a day only. Block headers come from any Bitcoin node or block explorer.

If PubPhys disappears

The proof still checks with those things. The Bitcoin date and the fingerprints need no PubPhys program at all.

Sealed contributions

A sealed contribution is signed, logged and timestamped while its text stays private (sealing). Its proof contains what you sealed, so keep the file private until you reveal it. A copy saved after the block dates the seal; one saved before holds no date. If you abandon the seal or delete your account, PubPhys deletes the content, and your saved proof is then the only copy.

Once you reveal it, a proof saved after the reveal holds two signed entries: proof.json, the sealed entry, which carries the date, and reveal.json, the reveal. README.txt then adds the check of the pair, which checks both and that the reveal names the sealed entry and your ORCID iD:

node $V/pubphys-verify.mjs reveal.json --trust trust-full.json --sealed proof.json --bitcoin

It ends with result: reveal pair verified and gives the seal date: the sealed entry's Bitcoin block. A copy saved before that block leaves out --bitcoin, as for proof.json.

What is sent where

The zip is made on request for your signed-in session and is not kept. Only fingerprints are sent to the public timestamp servers (alice.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org, bob.btc.calendar.opentimestamps.org, and finney.calendar.eternitywall.com); your result's page and the page reached after signing ask them from your browser too, which shows them your IP address (privacy notice).